A Constitutional Analysis of the Cabinet Delegation Controversy
By Seodi White: 27.07.2026
(This analysis is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (1994, as amended), Chapter VIII: The Executive, Sections 79, 80(5), 86(3), 87, 89(6), and 92(1)-(3))
Question 1: What is the legal effect of a Cabinet meeting chaired by the Second Vice-President by delegation from the President, where the First Vice-President is clearly not invited?
The answer to this question must be examined in two layers.
Layer 1: The President Cannot “Delegate” Chairing of Cabinet to the Second Vice-President
Section 89(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi allows the President to delegate “powers and functions” in writing to any member of the Cabinet or any government official. However, Section 92(3) is not a delegation provision — it is a specific constitutional rule that prescribes who presides over Cabinet meetings. The President cannot override Section 92(3) by using Section 89(6) to delegate the chairing role to the Second Vice-President.
The relationship between these two provisions is clear. Section 89(6) governs general executive powers — matters such as appointments, international agreements, and other administrative functions. Section 92(3) governs the specific internal procedure of Cabinet meetings. A general delegation power cannot override a specific constitutional prescription. The principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (a specific law overrides a general law) applies here. Section 92(3) is the specific constitutional command; Section 89(6) is the general delegation clause. The specific must prevail.
Layer 2: Excluding the First Vice-President Is Unlawful
The First Vice-President is a constitutionally mandated member of the Cabinet under Section 92(1). She is not merely an invitee — her membership is prescribed by the supreme law of the land. If the First Vice-President is present in Malawi, not in temporary absence, and not incapacitated under Section 87, then the President has no constitutional authority to exclude her from a Cabinet meeting.
There is no provision in the Constitution that empowers the President to unilaterally exclude the First Vice-President from Cabinet. The First Vice-President’s seat at the Cabinet table is guaranteed by the Constitution itself.
Question 2: Is such a meeting valid?
No. A Cabinet meeting chaired by someone who has no authority to preside — the Second Vice-President, when the First Vice-President is available — is constitutionally irregular and procedurally defective.
In constitutional law, actions taken by a body that is improperly constituted may be challenged as ultra vires (beyond lawful authority). Decisions taken at such a meeting could be declared null and void by the courts.
The Constitution establishes a strict, sequential hierarchy for who may preside over Cabinet meetings under Section 92(3):
The President presides by default. In the temporary absence of the President, the First Vice-President presides. Only in the temporary absence of both the President and the First Vice-President may the Second Vice-President preside. There is no scenario in which the Second Vice-President may preside while the First Vice-President is present and available, whether by delegation or otherwise.
The Issue of Location: Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Other Venues
The suggestion that the First Vice-President’s presence in Blantyre justifies her exclusion from a Cabinet meeting convened in Lilongwe has no basis in law or practice. Vice-Presidents and Cabinet Ministers travel across the country as part of their public service duties. Invitations to Cabinet meetings, issued by the Office of the President and Cabinet, reach officials wherever they are, and they are expected to travel to the meeting venue. Cabinet meetings have previously been held in Blantyre, Mzuzu, Mangochi, and Zomba — the location of a Cabinet meeting is not fixed to Lilongwe.
Therefore, the First Vice-President’s presence in Blantyre when invited to a Cabinet meeting would not justify excluding her. In any event, excluding her would be unlawful. Furthermore, as the presumptive presiding officer in the President’s absence, she could have decided to hold the meeting in Blantyre rather than travel to Lilongwe. The decision to hold the meeting in a different location does not strip her of her constitutional right to attend and preside.
Conclusion
The chairing of a Cabinet meeting by the Second Vice-President, by presidential delegation, while the First Vice-President is present and available, constitutes a breach of Section 92(3) of the Constitution. The First Vice-President cannot be excluded from Cabinet. Decisions taken at such a meeting are constitutionally irregular and may be challenged in court. The constitutional hierarchy for presiding over Cabinet meetings is mandatory, sequential, and not subject to presidential delegation.
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